Hofstra Law Review
Volume 9

Issue 1

Article 6

1980

Reexamining Fourth Amendment Seizures: A New Starting Point
Scott J. Glick

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Glick, Scott J. (1980) "Reexamining Fourth Amendment Seizures: A New Starting Point," Hofstra Law
Review: Vol. 9 : Iss. 1 , Article 6.
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss1/6

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra
Law. For more information, please contact lawlas@hofstra.edu.

Glick: Reexamining Fourth Amendment Seizures: A New Starting Point

NOTES
REEXAMINING FOURTH AMENDMENT
SEIZURES: A NEW STARTING POINT
Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and
citizens involves "seizures" of persons. 1

Chief Justice Warren, Terry v. Ohio
Traditionally, police officers have been required to show probable cause 2 in order to justify either an arrest 3 or the functional
equivalent of an arrest. 4 In Terry v. Ohio, decided in 1968, the
Supreme Court recognized for the first time that there exists a
stage of police-citizen encounter less intrusive than an arrest. 5 If an
individual is only briefly detained against his or her will,6 or is sim1. 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
2. Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution" to believe that a crime
has been or is being committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925);
cf. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (probable cause is reasonable ground for belief of guilt insofar as arresting officer is concerned). An arrest must
always be based on probable cause, see Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34-35 (1963),
although warrants are not always required. See note 28 infra.
3. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103 (1959) (whenever a suspect is
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom he is arrested).
4. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 214-16 (1979) (custodial interrogation at a police station amounts to a de facto arrest); Davis v. Mississippi, 394
U.S. 721, 726-28 (1969) (subjecting defendant to fingerprinting and interrogation in
stationhouse, regardless of whether technically characterized as an arrest, requires
probable cause).
5. 392 U.S. at 30; see Pilcher, The Law and Practice of Field Interrogation,58
J. CRthM. L.C. & P.S. 465, 468-73 (1967). On several occasions the Supreme Court
has distinguished the stop-and-frisk stage from the arrest stage. See, e.g., Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). But cf. People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 352
N.E.2d 562, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1976) (establishing a four-tiered system of analysisprobable cause to arrest, reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk, founded suspicion
for the common law right to inquire, and some objective credible reason for the right
to approach and request information). For a discussion criticizing the De Bour analysis as "unworkable," see Comment, People v. De Bour: The Power of the Police to
Stop and Frisk Citizens, 30 SYRACUSE L. REv. 893 (1979).
6. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (random check for driver's license and vehicle registration). Compare United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543 (1976) (fixed checkpoint) with United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873
(1975) (roving border patrol).
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ply frisked 7 (the "Terry stop"8 ), then police officers are required to
show only reasonable suspicion 9 to justify the action.

As Chief Justice Warren realized10 in Terry, however, there
may be a stage in a police-citizen encounter that exists prior to

even a Terry stop. Yet, until the recent decision of United States
v. Mendenhall,1 Chief Justice Warren's assertion had been largely
ignored by the Court. Although the Mendenhall decision commands no clear majority,12 the opinion by Justice Stewart, announcing the judgment of the Court, suggests a new stage

3

-a

7. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40
(1968) (stop and frisk for weapons).
8. Despite the fact that stop and frisk has been a "time-honored police procedure," LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution:Terry, Sibron, Peters, and
Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REv. 39, 42 (1968), it was not until Terry v. Ohio that the Supreme Court approved, for the first time, the seizure of persons upon less than probable cause. 392 U.S. at 30. Stop and frisk has since often been referred to as a "Terry
stop." See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 41, 45 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Blum, 614 F.2d 537, 539 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Chamberlin, 609 F.2d 1318, 1321-23 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Ashcroft, 607
F.2d 1167, 1170 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 2944 (1980); United States v.
Belle, 593 F.2d 487, 496 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Short, 570 F.2d 1051, 1055
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
9. Reasonable suspicion exists where the policeman can point to "specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts
...

,"

392 U.S. at 21, lead him "reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that

criminal activity may be afoot ...." Id. at 30. See generally 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 9.2 (1978).
10. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
11. 100 S.Ct. 1870 (1980).
12. Justice Stewart announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an
opinion in which Justice Rehnquist joined. 100 S.Ct. at 1873-80. Justice Powell,
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, joined the opinion, id. at 1880
(Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Burger,
C.J., and Blackmun, J.), in all but part II-A, id. at 1875-78, which for the purpose of
this Note is the critical part of the opinion.
13. Actually, the stage may not be so new. Arguably, the groundwork commenced with Terry v. Ohio, where the Court first recognized, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Warren, that not all encounters between citizens and the police are seizures.
See text accompanying note 1 supra. Indeed, as Professor Amsterdam has stated, the
Court's "1968 decisions are commonly read as recognizing three categories of street
encounters: mere conversation, which an officer may commence without any
particularizing cause; 'stops,' which require some reliable indicia of criminal activity not amounting to probable cause; and 'arrests,' which require probable cause."
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 376
(1974) (footnotes omitted). The stage is new, however, in the sense that an explicit
statement by the Supreme Court of the right of law-enforcement officials to make inquiries and seek citizen cooperation without some level of particularized suspicion
has never previously been made. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCE-

257-58 (Commentary 1975). Indeed, the Court
has yet to form a majority opinion as to this specific question. See note 107 infra, disDURE, PROPOSED OFFICIAL DRAFT
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new starting point-in search and seizure analysis. Justice Stewart's

opinion takes Chief Justice Warren's assertion one step further and
proposes that a threshold determination of whether an individual

has been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment be
for any seimade before consideration of the officer's justification
14
zure that might---or might not-have occurred.
Justice Stewart's opinion breathes new life into Chief Justice
Warren's assertion in recognizing again that not all encounters be-

tween policemen and citizens constitute seizures. 15 If the action
taken by the police does not amount to a seizure, then the officer

needs no articulable suspicion in order to take such action. 16 Although the fourth amendment applies to all police-citizen encounters, it is not violated despite the lack of articulable suspicion for
the simple reason that the citizen has not been seized.17
cussing the potential of a Court majority adopting the approach advocated by Justice
Stewart in Mendenhall.
14. 100 S. Ct. at 1877. For a full discussion of Justice Stewart's test, see text accompanying notes 88-106 infra. In Terry, the question whether officer McFadden in-

itially seized Terry when he approached him was never fully answered by the Court.
Due in part to an inadequate record, the Court assumed that up to the point of the
officer's physical contact with Terry, no seizure had occurred within the meaning of
the fourth amendment. 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. The fourth amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.

15. 100 S. Ct. at 1877.
16. Id. See also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 292 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
17. 100 S. Ct. at 1877. Professor Amsterdam, reflecting upon the Court's decisions after Terry, observed:
The fourth amendment, then, is ordinarily treated as a monolith: wherever it
restricts police activities at all, it subjects them to the same extensive restrictions that it imposes upon physical entries into dwellings. To label any police activity a "search" or "seizure" within the ambit of the amendment is to
impose those restrictions upon it. On the other hand, if it is not labeled a
"search" or "seizure," it is subject to no significant restrictionsof any kind.
It is only "searches" or "seizures" that the fourth amendment requires to be
reasonable: police activities of any other sort may be as unreasonable as the
police please to make them.
Amsterdam, supra note 13, at 388 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
It is important to realize that the question whether a seizure has occurred is one
separate and distinct from the issue presented in a Terry stop. If a citizen is seized,
albeit briefly, then reasonable suspicion is required to justify the stop. E.g., Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975). But if a citizen is not seized, the
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Determining when a seizure occurs therefore becomes crucial.
The police often learn critical information in the initial stages of
their encounters with citizens.' 8 The requisite level of suspicion either exists or does not exist at the moment of any subsequent seizure. 19 The validity of the procedure used to obtain that information is important because any information learned after the seizure
20
cannot be used in retroactive justification.
The purpose of this Note is to assess the importance of Justice
Stewart's analysis in United States v. Mendenhall and determine at
what point in police-citizen encounters a seizure occurs. 2 1 By examining the differences between seizures and non-seizures, and
the policy values behind the fourth amendment, it will be shown
that a "totality of the circumstances test," suggested by Justice
Stewart and expanded upon here, should be used to determine
when a seizure occurs. Although the test applies to all policecitizen encounters, this Note will limit its focus to Mendenhall-type
factual situations by examining the results which follow application
of the "totality" test to encounters between law-enforcement officials and citizens in public airports.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE PRIOR TO MENDENHALL

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution,
made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the
requirement of reasonable suspicion does not enter the analysis. See 100 S. Ct. at
1877. It is only after a seizure occurs that reasonable suspicion is required. Id. For
this reason, the stage suggested by Justice Stewart in Mendenhall must be viewed as
an addition to, rather than a change in, search and seizure analysis.
18. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) ("bulge" observed in
waist immediately after order to get out of the car).
19. 392 U.S. at 21-22; see United States v. Forero-Rincon, 626 F.2d 218, 220 (2d
Cir. 1980); cf. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98, 103 (1959) (both cases holding that information learned after an arrest cannot be
used to justify an arrest).
20. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963). See also
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600-03 (1975). If the initial seizure is illegal because
the requisite level of suspicion does not exist prior to the seizure, then the information learned by the police may be "tainted" and inadmissible as the "fruit of the poisonous tree." See text accompanying notes 156-158 infra.
21. The Supreme Court has in a long line of cases taken short but definite
steps in an effort to define when specific constitutional protections attach. See, e.g.,
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980) ("Miranda safeguards come into
play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its
functional equivalent."); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972) (sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel attaches upon the initiation of formal adversary
proceedings). Similarly, Justice Stewart's opinion in Mendenhall reminds us of the
need to determine when the protections of the fourth amendment attach.
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fourteenth amendment,2 2 provides that "[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches

and seizures, shall not be violated .... .23 Although some commentators have criticized the Supreme Court for its lack of clarity
and consistency with respect to fourth amendment doctrine, 24 the
accumulated weight of precedent has established definite rules of
25
law.
Before the landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio,26 the fourth
22. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949), which was the first case in which the Supreme Court made the fourth amendment applicable to the states. Although the Wolf case failed to make the exclusionary
rule applicable to the states, while Mapp subsequently did, it was only this aspect of
Wolf which Mapp overruled. 367 U.S. at 654-60.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (The full text of the fourth amendment is reprinted
in note 14 supra.) Although some historians have concluded that the first clause of
the fourth amendment was intended only as a "mere premise" for the second clause,
which condemns general warrants, see N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOP-

103
(1937), case law has given the clause its own vitality. See, e.g., South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Boyd v. United
MENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See generally A. BARTH, THE PRICE OF LIBERTY 94-110

(1961).
24. E.g., Amsterdam, supra note 13, at 349; Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329 (1973);
LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law . . . Has Not . . . Run

Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255, 255-57. The Court itself has conceded that fourth
amendment law has not been reduced to "complete order and harmony." Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 482-83 (1971). See also Chapman v. United States,
365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
25. The fourth and fourteenth amendments are limitations on the government
rather than on private persons. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-53
(1971); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). As a general rule, if the government obtains evidence in violation of these amendments, the evidence is inadmissible in the prosecution's direct case. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). But cf. United States v. Havens,
100 S. Ct. 1912 (1980); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222 (1971) (Unconstitutionally obtained evidence may be used to cross-examine
the defendant to impeach his credibility). See generally Little, The Exclusionary
Rule of Evidence as a Means of Enforcing Fourth Amendment Morality on Police, 3
IND. LEGAL F. 375 (1970).

The exclusionary rule is designed primarily to deter improper police conduct,
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 n.3 (1979); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477,
489 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 217-18 (1960); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-93 (1914), and extends
to all evidence that is the "fruit" of an illegal seizure. United States v. Crews, 100 S.
Ct. 1244, 1249-51 (1980); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 273-79 (1978);
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600-03 (1975). See generally Pitler, "The Fruit of the
Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 579 (1968). For a
comprehensive review of fourth amendment doctrine, see Professor LaFave's threevolume treatise, W. LAFAVE, supra note 9.
26. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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amendment prohibition against unreasonable seizures of persons
was consistently analyzed in terms of arrest, probable cause for arrest, and warrants based on such probable cause. 2 7 Although warrants are not always necessary, 28 probable cause has always been
required for an arrest to be constitutional. 29 Justice Brennan summarized the development of the requirement: "The standard of
probable cause thus represented the accumulated wisdom of precedent and experience as to the minimum justification necessary to
make the kind of intrusion involved in an arrest 'reasonable' under
the Fourth Amendment." 30
In Terry, the Supreme Court recognized for the first time that
not all seizures of persons constitute an arrest and, therefore, not
all seizures of persons require probable cause. 31 At issue in Terry
was a brief, on-the-street stop and frisk 32 for weapons, rather than
a full-fledged arrest. 3 The Court distinguished the two situations
by focusing on the different levels of intrusiveness presented by
each. 34 Since the stop and frisk was so substantially less intrusive
than a full-scale arrest, the Court deemed strict compliance with
the probable-cause requirement to be inappropriate. Rather, the
27. See generally 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 9, §§ 9.2-10.5; see also Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1979).
28. Exceptions to the warrant requirement have been clearly delineated for
both arrests, see United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (felony arrests in public places); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit), and searches, see

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plain view); Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to a lawful arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967) (hot pursuit); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (moving vehicle).
29. Kerv. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34-35 (1963).
30. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979).
31. In Terry, the Court concluded that a police officer "may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of
investigating possibly criminal behavior, even though there is no probable cause to
make an arrest." 392 U.S. at 22.
32. For a general review of stop and frisk procedures see Schwartz, Stop and
Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police), 58 J. CraiM. L.C. & P.S. 433
(1967).
33. 392 U.S. at 17-22. See generally MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, PROPOSED OFFICIAL DRAFT § 110.2 (1975).

34. 392 U.S. at 17-22. The Court rejected, however, the notion that the fourth
amendment applied to arrests but not to stops: "There is some suggestion in the use
of such terms as 'stop' and 'frisk' that such police conduct is outside the purview
of the Fourth Amendment because neither action arises to the level of a 'search' or
,seizure' within the meaning of the Constitution. We emphatically reject this notion."
Id. at 16 (citations omitted); accord, Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). The Court
did, however, hold that the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment did not
apply to the investigative stop, which need only be tested against the "reasonableness" requirement 392 U.S. at 20.
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Court concluded that a balancing test should be utilized to deter35
mine if the stop was "reasonable" under the fourth amendment.
Under this balancing test, the government's interest in crime prevention and detection was weighed against the individual's interest
in avoiding the intrusion.
In the stop-and-frisk situation presented in Terry, the scales
tipped toward the government's interest in crime prevention, thus
justifying the stop on less than probable cause. 36 The Court held
that when the officer "patted down the outer ... clothing" 37 of his
suspect, he was "warranted in believing petitioner was armed and
thus presented a threat to the officer's safety. "38 At the time of the
stop and frisk the officer was not arresting the suspect, and thus
did not need probable cause to believe that a crime had been or
was about to be committed. Rather, since the intrusion on the suspect's personal freedom was limited in comparison to the officer's
reasonable belief that Terry was "armed with a weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against him,"3 9 that is, in comparison to the government's interest in crime prevention, the stop and
40
frisk was reasonable under the fourth amendment.
The majority in Terry limited its decision to the facts.41 Indeed, the Court specifically declined to address the question of the
"constitutional propriety of an investigative 'seizure' upon less than
42
probable cause for purposes of 'detention' and/or interrogation."
Any confusion over this issue was laid to rest in Adams v.
35. 392 U.S. at 21.
36. Id. at 19-22. Although it is clear that the right of personal security belongs

to citizens on the streets, see id. at 9, the Court's concern with the "need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in
situations where they may lack probable cause for an arrest," id. at 24, led it to conclude that only "reasonable suspicion" would be required for a stop and frisk. Id. at
30. For a definition of reasonable suspicion, see note 9 supra.
It may be argued that the decision in Terry was a reaction to the high levels of
crime at the time and the need to do something about it, rather than a pure interpretation of constitutional law. The Court in several places noted the "easy availability
of firearms to potential criminals," id. at 24 n.21, the number of police officers
"killed in the line of duty," id., the number of "deaths and injuries inflicted with
guns and knives," id. at 24, and the overwhelming governmental interest in preventing crime and saving lives. Id. at 22-24. See generally L. TIFFANY, D. MciNTYPE, & D. ROTENBERG, DFTECTION OF C.ME 44-57, 87-95 (1967).

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

392 U.S. at 19.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 23-30.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 19 n.16.
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Williams, 43 where the Court reaffirmed Terry and applied the balancing test to investigative seizures. The Court concluded that
[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who
lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable
cause to arrest, to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime
to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Termj recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an
intermediate response ....

A brief stop of a suspicious individ-

ual in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status
quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be
most reasonable in light of facts known to the officer at the
44
time.
In the cases which followed Terry and Adams, the Court
continued to apply a balancing test to various types of policecitizen encounters. 4 5 As the test developed, four major factors
became relevant: (a) the need for the stop,4 0 (b) the suspect's
interest in avoiding the intrusion, 4 7 (c) the gravity of the intrusion,4 8 and (d) the likelihood of the suspect's involvement, or potential involvement, in criminal activity. 49 These factors thus fur43.
44.

407 U.S. 143 (1972).
Id. at 145-46 (citations omitted); cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422

U.S. 873 (1975) (Terry rationale applied to roving border patrol).
45. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (random stop and check for
identification); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (random check for driver's license and vehicle registration); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (order
to get out of car after lawful stop). See generally Greenberg, The Balance of Interests
Theory and the Fourth Amendment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action
Since Camara and See, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1011 (1973).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-60 (1976);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879 (1975); Alemida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21. Other factors taken into account in considering the need for the stop include the public interest served, the seriousness of the offense, and the need for prompt action. See
United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 500 (2d Cir. 1979).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878; Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. at 21-23; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967). The factors the court takes into account here include the suspect's reasonable expectations
of privacy and the location of the intrusion. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 10 S. Ct.
1371 (1980) (home); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 50-51 (street); Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. at 654-55 (car).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 879-80; Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21-23. Other factors considered here include the extent to which
the defendant is impeded in his actions and the extent to which there is interference
with general traffic. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 50-51; United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558.
49. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 50-51; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
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nished a framework for the Court's consideration of whether a
particular seizure was reasonable under the fourth amendment. 50
Of course, a determination of the reasonableness of a seizure
cannot determine whether a seizure actually occurred. It is interesting to point out, as Chief Justice Warren did in Terry, that
"[sItreet encounters between citizens and police are incredibly rich
in diversity. They range from wholly friendly exchanges of pleasantries or mutually useful information to hostile confrontations of
armed men, involving arrests or injuries or loss of life." 51 Given
this diversity, the Court noted that there exists a class of encounters between policemen and citizens in which a person is not
seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment.5 2 Justice
White agreed with this conclusion in his concurring opinion,
stating that "[tjjhere is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a
policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets. Absent special circumstances [reasonable suspicion], the person approached may not be detained or frisked, but may refuse to co53
operate and go on his way."

However, the observations of Chief Justice Warren and Justice
White seem to have been lost in the wake of Terry's primary holding: that a lesser degree of suspicion is necessary for a stop and
frisk than for a formal arrest. Since 1968, the Court has applied the
Terry balancing test to police-citizen encounters without addressing the threshold question of when a person has been seized
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 54 The law developed
at 654-55; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 879-83. Other factors used by
courts here include the need for specific and articulable facts, the circumstances
viewed as a whole and not singly, and the circumstances as viewed through the eyes
of an experienced law-enforcement officer. See United States v. Cortez, 595 F.2d
505, 507-08 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Roundtree, 596 F.2d 672, 674 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 149 (1979); United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 882, 884-86
(6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 59 (2d Cir. 1977).
50. See generally Greenberg, supra note 45.
51. 392 U.S. at 13.
52. Id. at 19 n.16.
53. Id. at 34 (White, J., concurring). Justice Harlan also agreed that a fourth
amendment seizure does not occur in all encounters between citizens and police,
when he stated in his concurring opinion in Terry that policemen have "the liberty
(again possessed by every citizen) to address questions to other persons, for ordinarily the person addressed has an equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away
.... Id. at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
54. In Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), a companion case to Terry, the
Court was concerned with an issue similar to the one presented in Terry. The facts
of Sibron, however, led the Court to an interesting question which it declined to address. Officer Martin was on patrol in Brooklyn in the spring of 1965, when he ob-

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1980

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9: 211

by Terry and its progeny was never intended to deal with this

question. Indeed, the Terry Court specifically stated that it had to
assume a seizure had not occurred prior to the frisk of the suspect

because of an inadequate record. 55 A full articulation by the Supreme Court of when a seizure occurs would have answered the
question and would therefore have been an addition to-a starting

point for-the Terry analysis. Although some circuit courts56 and
some state courts 5 7 had addressed this issue, by the time certiorari
was granted in Mendenhal158 the Supreme Court had yet to consider the assertion, originally made by Chief Justice Warren in
Terry, that not all encounters between citizens and police constitute seizures.
served Sibron in conversation with six to eight persons known by him to be narcotics
addicts. Later that evening, Sibron entered a restaurant and spoke with three more
known addicts. While Sibron was eating, Officer Martin approached him and asked
him to step outside. Once outside, Officer Martin told Sibron, "You know what I'm
after," whereupon Sibron "mumbled" something and reached in his pocket. Officer
Martin simultaneously reached in Sibron's pocket and discovered glassine envelopes
which later turned out to contain heroin. Id. at 44-46. In considering the question
whether Officer Martin had reasonable suspicion to believe Sibron was armed and
dangerous, the Court remarked: "We are not called upon to decide in this case
whether there was a 'seizure' of Sibron inside the restaurant antecedent to the physical seizure which accompanied the search." Id. at 63. The Court did not consider
this issue because the record was "unclear with respect to what transpired between
Sibron and the officer inside the restaurant." Id. Ultimately, the Court regarded this
deficiency in the record as "immaterial, since Patrolman Martin obtained no new information in the interval between his initiation of the encounter in the restaurant
and his physical seizure and search of Sibron outside." Id.
55. 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
56. E.g., United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1041-42 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 2998 (1980); United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62, 67 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978); United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663, 668
(6th Cir. 1977). See also United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 498 (2d Cir. 1979)
(noting but reserving the question).
57. E.g., Crowder v. United States, 379 A.2d 1183, 1185 (D.C. App. 1977); State
v. Tsukiyama, 56 Haw. 8, 11-18, 525 P.2d 1099, 1102-05 (1974); State v. Sheffield, 62
N.J. 441, 445-48, 303 A.2d 68, 70-71 (1973); Commonwealth v. Hall, 475 Pa. 482,
486-88, 380 A.2d 1238, 1240-41 (1977); id. at 489-91, 380 A.2d at 1242-43 (Manderino,
J., dissenting).
58. Certiorari was granted on October 1, 1979. 444 U.S. 822 (1979). Although it
is interesting to note that the government in its petition for certiorari failed to raise
the question whether the defendant was initially seized, the government did note, in
the course of arguing that the level of suspicion necessary to justify the stop was
slight, that it was "arguable that the initial encounter between the DEA agents and
the respondent in this case was not even a 'seizure' of her person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Petition for Certiorari at 19, United States v.
Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980). Moreover, the government devoted seven pages
of its brief to the question whether the defendant had been seized. Brief for United
States at 19-26, United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980).
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UNITED STATES V. MENDENHALL

Sylvia Mendenhall arrived at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport
on a commercial airflight from Los Angeles, California. 5 9 As she got
off the plane, she was observed by agents of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA)60 who were present at the airport for the purpose of detecting illegal narcotics traffic. 6 1 Because she appeared

to possess some characteristics the agents believed were similar to
62
those possessed by persons known to unlawfully carry narcotics,

59. 100 S. Ct. at 1873.
60. Id. The Drug Enforcement Administration was established in the Department of Justice on July 1, 1973, by Reorganization Plan 2 of 1973. U.S. GOVERNMENT MANUAL, 1980-81, at 388. As stated in the manual,
[t]he mission of DEA is to enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations and to bring to the Criminal and Civil Justice systems of the United
States or any other competent jurisdiction, those organizations, and principal
members of organizations involved in the growing, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances appearing in or destined for illicit traffic in the
United States.
Id.
61. 100 S. Ct. at 1873. Since October 1974, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has conducted an elaborate airport surveillance program designed to intercept couriers transporting illegal narcotics in the United States. The program, originally developed by DEA agents at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport, a major drug
distribution center, now operates at more than twenty airports throughout the United
States. Petition for Certiorari at 2-3, United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. 1870
(1980). Pursuant to the program, trained and experienced DEA agents observe passengers for characteristics which, based on the agents' experience, distinguish drug
couriers from other passengers. Id. at 3, United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. 1870
(1980). For a description of the operation and the success of the DEA program see
United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 538-39 (E.D. Mich. 1976), affd, 556
F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977).
62. 100 S. Ct. at 1873. These traits and characteristics, referred to as the "drug
courier profile," include seven primary and four secondary characteristics believed
by DEA agents to be common among drug couriers. United States v. Elmore, 595
F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979). The primary characteristics are: (1) arrival from a
source city, a city from which drugs are shipped to other points for sale or further
distribution; (2) carrying little or no baggage, or large quantities of empty suitcases;
(3) unusual itinerary, such as rapid turnaround time for very long airline trips; (4) the
use of aliases; (5) carrying unusually large amounts of currency, in the many thousands of dollars, usually on their person; (6) buying an airline ticket with a large
amount of small denomination currency; and (7) unusual nervousness. The secondary
characteristics include: (1) the almost exclusive use of public transportation, particularly taxicabs, in departing from the airport; (2) immediately making a telephone
call after deplaning; (3) leaving false or ficticious call-back telephone numbers with
the airline being utilized; and (4) excessively frequent travel to source or distribution
cities. Id.
For some recent cases considering suppression motions arising out of DEA's
program, see United States v. Forero-Rincon, 626 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1980);
United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v.
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the agents approached Ms. Mendenhall. 63
After identifying themselves as federal agents, the agents
6 4
asked to see the suspect's airline ticket and some identification.
Ms. Mendenhall produced her Michigan driver's license bearing
the name Sylvia Mendenhall and an airline ticket which was issued
in the name of Annette Ford. 65 When asked why the ticket bore a
different name, the suspect responded that she "just felt like using
66
that name."
At this point the agents asked the defendant how long she had
been in California. When the defendant responded that it had
been only two days, the agents' suspicions became aroused because
it was a "very short, abbreviated trip to go that distance and return." 6 7 When one of the agents specifically identified himself as a

federal narcotics agent, the suspect "became quite shaken, extremely nervous. She had a hard time speaking." 68 The agent returned the suspect's ticket and driver's license and requested that
she accompany them to a DEA office in the airport for further
questions. The defendant did so, although the record did not indi69
cate verbal agreement or disagreement.
Roundtree, 596 F.2d 672 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 149 (1979); United States
v. Trautman, 590 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1979).
63. According to Agent Anderson, Special Agent with DEA, who observed and
approached the defendant, the following characteristics possessed by the defendant
drew his attention to her: (a) The defendant was the last person to deplane, which in
Agent Anderson's experience is common of drug couriers who wish to obtain a clear
view of the area inside the terminal; (b) The defendant looked nervous as she deplaned, as if she were trying to detect police in the terminal area; (c)The defendant
failed to claim any luggage, despite the fact she had taken a long journey; and (d)
The defendant changed airlines for the next portion of her journey even though she
already had a valid ticket for the same destination. The fourth factor, particularly,
aroused Agent Anderson's suspicions because drug couriers often change airlines to
confuse anyone who may be following them. United States v. Mendenhall, Crim. No.
6-80208 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 18, 1976) (Memorandum and Order of the District Court at
2-3), reo'd, 596 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd and remanded, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980).
64. 100 S. Ct. at 1873. Justice Stewart concluded that the defendant was not
"seized" at this point, based on the standards he articulated in his opinion. Id. at
1877; see text accompanying notes 99-100 infra. On the other hand, Justice White
and the dissenters "assumed" that the defendant was "seized," within the meaning
of the fourth amendment, when the agents asked to see her identification and airline
ticket. 100 S. Ct. at 1885 (White, J., dissenting). The dissenters' analysis is in accord
with the traditional analysis discussed in note 17 supra.
65. 100 S. Ct. at 1873-74.
66. Id. at 1874.
67. United States v. Mendenhall, Crim. No. 6-80208 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 15, 1976)
(Transcript of Supression Hearing at 15).
68. Id.
69. 100 S. Ct. at 1874. Although the trial court found that the defendant
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At the office, the agents informed the defendant that she had a
right to withhold her consent to a search of her handbag and then
asked if she would consent to such a search. 70 She responded, "Go

ahead," and voluntarily handed the agent her purse. 71 The search
of her handbag revealed a receipt for an airline ticket issued to "'F.

Bush," which the defendant stated she had previously used for her

72
flight from Pittsburgh to California, by way of Chicago.
With their suspicions heightened further, the agents called
a female police officer of the Metro Airport Police Department to
conduct a search of the defendant. 73 After obtaining the defen-

dant's consent to the search, 74 the officer informed the defendant
that she had to remove all of her clothing. 75 The defendant stated

that she had a plane to catch, but was assured by the policewoman
accompanied the agents to the DEA office in the "spirit of apparent cooperation,"
United States v. Mendenhall, Crim. No. 6-80208 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 18, 1976) (Memorandum and Order at 8), and Justice Stewart agreed, 100 S. Ct. at 1878, it is arguable
in light of Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), that the defendant was seized
at this point. See 100 S. Ct. at 1887-88 (White, J., dissenting). At issue in Dunaway
was the legality of custodial questioning on less than probable cause. 442 U.S. at
202. The defendant had been picked up by the police in connection with a murder
investigation. He was then driven to police headquarters in a police car and placed
in an interrogation room where he was questioned by officers. The defendant eventually made statements that incriminated him in the crime. Id. at 203. The Court
held that the detention of the defendant was "indistinguishable" from a traditional
arrest and as such required probable cause. Id. at 216.
In light of Dunaway, the request by the agents in Mendenhall that the defendant
accompany them to the DEA office easily could have carried with it the implication
of an obligation, which unless clearly stated to be voluntary, may have been an awesome experience. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, PROPOSED
OFFICIAL DRAFT § 110.1 (1975); id. at 261 (Commentary).
70. 100 S. Ct. at 1874.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Officer Beverly Mersier responded to Agent Anderson's request. At the suppression hearing, Agent Anderson testified that the request for a female officer to
conduct a strip search of a female suspect is a "regular airport procedure." United
States v. Mendenhall, Crim. No. 6-80208 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 18, 1976) (Transcript of
Suppression Hearing at 16).
74. 100 S. Ct. at 1874. Officer Mersier asked the DEA agents if the defendant
had consented to the search. The agents said that she had, and Officer Mersier then
asked the defendant to accompany her to a private search room. At the search room,
Officer Mersier again asked the defendant if she consented to the search. Id. A majority of the Supreme Court concluded that the consent was valid. Id. at 1879-80.
75. Because drug couriers often carry illegal narcotics on their person, strip
searches are a common occurrence in drug-related investigations. See, e.g., United
States v. Aman, 624 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Webb, 623 F.2d 758
(2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Perkins, 608 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1979). See generally
3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 10.5(b).
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that if she was not carrying narcotics "there would be no problem." 76 As the defendant began to disrobe, she voluntarily removed from her undergarments two small packages, one of which
appeared to contain heroin. She handed both packages to the policewoman. 77 The defendant was subsequently
placed under arrest
78
heroin.
of
possession
with
charged
and
Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress introduction of
the heroin as the fruit of an unlawful search. The district court
denied the motion, concluding that the initial approach and request to see her identification and airline ticket was a permissible
investigative stop, 79 based on specific and articulable facts, consistent with the Supreme Court decision in Terry. The district court
also found that the defendant had accompanied the agents to the
DEA office voluntarily and had freely consented to the search in
80
the DEA office.
The defendant's subsequent conviction was at first reversed by
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in an unreported decision. The court stated only that the case was "indistinguishable
from U.S. v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717,"81 where DEA agents seized
heroin under circumstances considered by the Sixth Circuit to be
substantially similar to those in Mendenhall.8 2 Subsequently, however, the court vacated its decision, granted a rehearing en banc,
and-although reinstating the panel decision-concluded that the
defendant had not validly consented to the search of her person in
the DEA office. 83 Yet, the court offered no factual analysis to support its conclusion. The United States appealed and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari on October 1, 1979.84
76. 100 S. Ct. at 1874. Although counsel for the defendant argued that the defendant did not consent to the search, relying principally on the fact the defendant
indicated that she had a plane to catch, Brief for Respondent at 50-52, United States
v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980), according to a majority of the Supreme Court
"the trial court was entitled to view the statement as simply an expression of concern
that the search be conducted quickly." 100 S. Ct. at 1879-80.
77. 100 S. Ct. at 1874.
78. Id.
79. United States v. Mendenhall, Crim. No. 6-80208 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 18, 1976)
(Memorandum and Order at 5).
80. Id. (Memorandum and Order at 8-10).
81. See United States v. Mendenhall, 596 F.2d 706, 707 (6th Cir. 1979) (en
banc) (quoting unreported panel decision).
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. 444 U.S. 822 (1979).
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While the government did not focus in its petition for certiorari on whether the defendant was seized when the agents initially
approached her, the issue was raised in its brief.85 Because the issue on appeal had been whether the defendant's consent to the
search was voluntary or was the product of an earlier violation of
the fourth amendment, 6 Justice Stewart concluded that it was necessary to first determine if there had been an unlawful detention
87
prior to the defendant's oral consent to be searched.
Justice Stewart's Test
Justice Stewart's conclusion that the defendant was not seized
within the meaning of the fourth amendment was based on two
premises. First, although the fourth amendment protects an individual's right of personal security as he or she walks through a public airport, 88 the fourth amendment is not intended to eliminate all
contact between citizens and the police. 89 Rather, the fourth
amendment only protects citizens against arbitrary and oppressive
85. Brief for United States at 19, United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. 1870
(1980); see note 58 supra.
86. 596 F.2d at 707.
87. 100 S. Ct. at 1875 n.5. Only Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Stewart's opinion in its entirety. See note 12 supra. Justice Powell, Chief Justice Burger, and Justice Blackmun, the other members of the Court who created the majority for the purpose of the judgment, did not reach the seizure question because neither the trial
nor appellate courts had considered the question. In their view, it was therefore appropriate to assume that the stop constituted a seizure. 100 S. Ct. at 1880 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Stewart's conclusion that
the determination of the seizure question "is essential to the correct disposition of
the other issues in the case," id. at 1876 n.5, was premised on the belief that in the
district court and the court of appeals the parties "evidently assumed that the respondent was seized when she was approached on the airport concourse and was
asked if she would show her identification and airline ticket," id. at 1875 n.5, and
that assumption rested "on a serious misapprehension of federal constitutional law."
Id. at 1876. Because the major question throughout the controversy was whether the
defendant had been detained by DEA agents, Justice Stewart concluded that the evidentiary record in the trial court was "adequate to permit consideration of the contention." Id.
Even though Justice Stewart was correct in concluding that the issue was essential to the proper disposition of other issues in the case, the case should have been
remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on the question, rather than
to address in the Supreme Court a fact-sensitive question with a totality of the circumstances assessment. See id. at 1885 (White, J., dissenting). See also Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543,
548-50 (1968).
88. 100 S. Ct. at 1875.
89. Id. at 1876; accord, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
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interferences with personal liberty. 90 According to Justice Stewart,
"[a]s long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to
disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion
upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require some particularized and objective justification. "9 1 In
support of this premise, Justice Stewart cited Chief Justice Warren's observation, dormant in the 12 years since Terry, 92 that not
all encounters between citizens and the police constitute fourth
amendment seizures. 9 3
Justice Stewart's second premise was based on a concern that
characterizing every street encounter as a seizure, while not enhancing any fourth amendment interest, "would impose wholly
unrealistic restrictions upon a wide variety of legitimate law enforcement practices." 94 He noted that previous Supreme Court decisions have recognized the need to give law-enforcement officers
greater investigative flexibility, 95 and quoted the following passage
from Schneckloth v. Bustamonte96 in support: "Without such investigations, those who were innocent might be falsely accused, and
those who were guilty might wholly escape prosecution, and many
crimes would go unsolved. In short, the security of all would be di97
minished."
Given the degree of intrusion and the government's interest in
law enforcement, Justice Stewart concluded that a person was
seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment only if "in
view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." 9 8
Consistent with this test, the circumstances that might indicate a
seizure had occurred would include "[a] the threatening presence
of several officers, [b] the display of a weapon by an officer, [c]
some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or [d] the use
90. 100 S. Ct. at 1877; see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 554;
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20-21;
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 536-37.
91. 100 S. Ct. at 1877 (emphasis added).
92. See id. at 1875-78. But see Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 222 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
93. See 100 S. Ct. at 1877. See generally 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 9.2(g).
94. 100 S. Ct. at 1877.
95. Id.; see Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. at 22-27.
96. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
97. Id. at 225; see Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963).
98. 100 S. Ct. at 1877.
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of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." 99 In light of the general test
and specific examples quoted, Justice Stewart concluded that the
conduct in Mendenhall, "without more, did not amount to an intrusion upon any constitutionally protected interest."' 00 Thus, no
seizure had occurred.
Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Stewart in concluding that no
seizure had occurred. 1 1 Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun, did not reach the seizure issue because "neither of the courts below considered the question
.... ,,2Accordingly, Justice Powell assumed, as did the courts
below, that a seizure had occurred; however, Justice Powell went
on to conclude that based on the totality of the evidence the seizure was a permissible one, based on reasonable suspicion in light
of Terry.10 3 In spite of the differing analyses regarding the seizure
issue, a majority was easily formed. All five Justices believed themselves bound by the district court's finding that the defendant had
voluntarily consented to the search of her person. 1°4 Since there
was a valid consent to the search, and there was no prior unlawful
seizure that would taint the defendant's consent, 10 5 the Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals decision and remanded the
06
case for further proceedings.'
BEYOND MENDENHALL

Justice Stewart's opinion in Mendenhall presents a turning
point in the approach to police-citizen encounters. Indeed, since
Mendenhall a number of federal decisions have relied upon that
opinion in analyzing fourth amendment seizure problems.' 0 7 While
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1873.
102. Id. at 1880 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
103. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
104. Id. (opinion of Stewart, J.).
105. That is, the defendant was either not seized (according to Justices Stewart
and Rehnquist) or was seized pursuant to the DEA agents' reasonable suspicion (according to Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Blackmun).
106. Id. at 1880.
107. See, e.g., United States v. Fry, 622 F.2d 1218, 1221 (5th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211, 1214-15 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Me Shan v.
Georgia, 155 Ga. App. 518, 271 S.E.2d 659 (1980). The test enunciated by Justice
Stewart to determine when a seizure occurs was never specifically rejected by the
other members of the Court. Indeed, the concurring Justices stated that they did
"not necessarily disagree with the views expressed in Part II-A," of Justice Stewart's
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it is well-settled that the amendment protects citizens from unreasonable seizures,108 the relevant question for Justice Stewart arises
opinion. 100 S. Ct. at 1880 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.). While this footnote in the concurring opinion may not mean that Part II-A of Justice Stewart's opinion is now the
view of a majority of the Court, it takes on a greater significance in light of the opinions of the Court in Reid v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. 2752 (1980) (per curiam), decided
one month after Mendenhall.
In Reid, the Court was confronted with a fact pattern substantially similar to the
one presented in Mendenhall. In both cases the defendant had been observed walking through an airport and was approached by DEA agents who requested some
identification. The opinions by the Court in Reid, however, should be separately emphasized for several reasons. First, although the majority in Reid held that the DEA
agent did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant when he did, id. at
2754, it failed to consider the question whether the defendant was even seized
within the meaning of the fourth amendment in the first place. What is most surprising is that Justice Stewart, who addressed and answered the question in Mendenhall,
is part of the majority in Reid. (The opinion of the Court in Reid is per curiam and is
supported by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, White, and Stewart.) Further, the
majority in Reid never even cites to Mendenhall, despite the similarity in the cases.
Even more interesting is the opinion by Justice Powell in Reid, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. These same Justices concurred in Mendenhall.
As noted above, their opinion in Mendenhall did not necessarily disavow Justice
Stewart's test for determining when a seizure occurs. In Reid, however, these Justices went further, seemingly endorsing Justice Stewart's approach in Mendenhall.
First, Justice Powell stated that Reid is "similar in many respects to United States V.
Mendenhall." 100 S. Ct. at 2754 (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J. and
Blackmun, J.). He then indicated that the "threshold question in Mendenhall, as
here, was whether the agent's initial stop of the suspect constituted a seizure within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added). This is significant because for the first time, a majority of the Supreme Court
has acknowledged that the threshold question in police-citizen encounters is
whether the initial contact between a citizen and the police constitutes a seizure
within the meaning of the fourth amendment (Justices Stewart and Rehnquist in
Mendenhall, and Justice Powell, Chief Justice Burger, and Justice Blackmun
in Reid).
This however is not the end of the significance of Reid. Justice Powell next
quoted Justice Stewart's test from Mendenhall to determine when a seizure occurs.
He went on to remind us that he did not necessarily indicate disagreement with
Justice Stewart's views in Mendenhall. After then observing that the threshold seizure question was not considered by the courts below in Reid, Justice Powell stated
"that issue remains open for consideration by the state courts in light of the opinions
in Mendenhall." Id. at 2755 (Powell, J., concurring).
This is an interesting statement. Does it mean that Justices Powell and
Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger have now adopted Justice Stewart's test in
Mendenhall? Does it mean, even if they have not, that they realize Justice Stewart's
approach may be the correct approach and that lower courts should now consider
Justice Stewart's approach when evaluating police-citizen encounters? It is doubtful
anyone can yet know with certainty what this statement means, although as noted
above, supra, some federal and state courts have followed Justice Stewart's approach.
108. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse,
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prior to any determination of the seizure's reasonableness. The
question is, "When does a seizure occur"?
If Sylvia Mendenhall had asked whether she was free to leave
and the DEA agent told her she was not, then any ambiguity concerning the nature of the encounter would have been clarified-a
seizure would have occurred. If the agent upon his approach had
advised her that she was free to leave, but she chose to remain,
then again the situation would have been clear-no seizure would
have occurred. The problem arose, however, because nothing was
said by either the agents or the defendant to clarify the situation. 10 9 The Court was "confronted with a substantially ambiguous
set of objective facts from which [it had to] determine whether a
seizure of the person [had] indeed occurred." 110
Mendenhall illustrates the need for an analytical framework
within which trial courts can resolve these ambiguities and thus determine whether a seizure occurs within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. It does not, however, satisfy that need. As Professor
LaFave has pointed out, there are several alternative approaches
that can be taken to establish this framework. Among the approaches that can be taken are:
[W]hether the officer would permit the suspect to leave?
Whether the suspect believed he was still free to leave? Whether
440 U.S. 648, 653-55 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 877
(1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9, 20-22 (1968).
109. Although one way to resolve any ambiguity would be to require the officer

upon approaching to advise the person that he or she was free to leave and did not
have to cooperate, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would impose such a restriction on the police. Warning requirements are generally not triggered until a person
is taken into custody. Custodial interrogation has been defined as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Indeed, the Supreme
Court has held that Miranda warnings do not apply to the questioning of suspects
who are neither arrested nor detained against their will. Beckwith v. United States,
425 U.S. 341, 344 (1976). Indeed, the Miranda Court placed its own limits on the
decision:
Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime. . . .General on-the-scene questioning as to
facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the factfinding process is not affected by our holding. It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in
law enforcement. In such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in
the process of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present
384 U.S. at 477-78. See generally W. LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 10(b), at 95-106.
110. Brief for United States at 22, United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S.Ct. 1870
(1980).
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the suspect consented to the interview? Whether by some objective test a restraint had occurred? Or [whether] 'the 11approach
of
1
an officer is the same as the seizure of an individual?'
The first approach places the trial court in an untenable position because the court is required to determine the state of mind
of the officer. This, according to Professor LaFave, is unrealistic
because "in most instances the officer will not think ahead to such
a possibility . . . because suspects being questioned on the street
ordinarily do not attempt to leave. '" 112 Any test with the purpose of
identifying street encounters that are not seizures must be expressed in terms which can be easily applied by the officer in the
field. 1 13 The second approach is therefore also not satisfactory because the officer is required to determine what the suspect's state
of mind is, a skill that " 'would require a prescience neither the
police nor anyone else possesses.' "114
The rationale that makes utilization of the first approach inappropriate also makes utilization of the third approach, the consent
standard, inappropriate. Most suspects do not attempt to leave or
otherwise manifest their lack of consent." 5 This is illustrated in
one empirical study which concluded that
[i]t is not meaningful in practice to attempt to distinguish between field interrogation with consent and that which takes place
without consent. In high-crime areas particularly, persons who
stop and answer police questions do so for a variety of reasons,
including a willingness to cooperate with police, a fear of police,
a belief that a refusal to cooperate will result in arrest, or a com6
bination of all three."1
The fifth standard, which would equate the approach of an officer with the seizure itself, completely ignores the fourth amendment value, the protection of individual freedom, that search and
seizure analysis should be responsive to. As long as the individual

111.

3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 9.2(g), at 48 (emphasis in original) (quoting

Comment, "Stop and Frisk" Under the Fourth Amendment: Terry and Sibron, 6
Hous. L.
112.
113.
114.

REv. 333, 337 (1968)).
Id. at 52.
Id. at 50-51.
Id. at 51 (quoting United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1969)).

115. Id. at 52; see Pilcher, supra note 5, at 473.
116.

L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRa, & D. ROTENBERG, supra note 36, at 17.
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retains his or her freedom to leave, the mere approach of a law7
enforcement officer cannot be said to constitute a seizure."1
Professor LaFave suggested use of the objective standard. This

approach has two important advantages over the others. First,
courts will not be forced into the "guesswork" required by the
more subjective tests. Second, law-enforcement officers will be in a
better position to assess what is legally permissible., The latter
advantage is especially important when the officer is required to
make split-second decisions in the field."19 Having a clearly defined and easily understandable objective approach therefore best
serves society's interests in both law enforcement and the perpetuation of constitutional government.
The Totality of the Circunwtances Test
Any fair and effective test must allow examination of the totality of the circumstances of the encounter to determine whether a
seizure has occurred within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
However, at least two considerations should be focused upon in
detail. First, the trial court needs to examine actions taken by the
police during the encounter. Specifically, a determination of
whether the police by means of physical force or show of authority
have restrained the liberty of an individual is critical. 120 It is easily
stated that the degree to which an individual's liberty may be restrained depends upon an officer's conduct, but it is difficult to
arrive at a reasoned conclusion without the assessment of objective
factors. Whether the defendant acted voluntarily in a spirit of apparent cooperation-or without consent in submission to a show of
authority-depends on an examination of both the overt and subtle
actions of the police. 121 For while not all police-citizen encounters
constitute seizures, 122 any encounter can easily be transformed into
a coercive atmosphere.
The second consideration upon which trial courts should focus
in assessing whether a seizure has occurred requires expansion
upon the general test urged by Justice Stewart in Mendenhall. By
117. See text accompanying notes 88-100 supra.
118. 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 9, § 9.2(g), at 52.
119. Compare id. at 56-57 with Schwartz, supra note 32, at 448-49.
120. See 392 U.S. at 19.
121. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968); text accompanying note 99
supra.

122. See 100 S. Ct. at 1877; 392 U.S. at 19 n.16; People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d
210, 216-17, 352 N.E.2d 562, 567, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380 (1976).
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that standard, a seizure occurs if "in view of all the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed
that he was not free to leave."12 3 That test incorporates an examination of actions taken by the police, 124 an examination advocated
above. It fails, however, to provide adequate focus upon the policy
values underlying the fourth amendment. The amendment was designed to protect an individual's privacy. 125 However, the amendment protects only a person's reasonable expectations of privacy.1 2 6
This is not, however, a subjective test. The objective factor-the
location of the encounter-is of critical importance precisely because the reasonableness of an individual's privacy expectation is
dependent upon the environment. One end of the spectrum has
historically been defined by an individual's expectations of privacy
in his or her home. As Justice Stevens stated for the Court in
Payton v. New York, 127 "[t]he Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of
privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home . ... 128,
Thus, the second factor in the totality test advocated requires an
evaluation of an individual's reasonable expectations of privacy in
the location of the encounter.
123. 100 S. Ct. at 1877.
124. Id.
125. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886); see Standford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1965); R. DAVIS,
FEDERAL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 5 (1964). See generally A. BARTH, supra note 23,
at 75.
The right of privacy has been referred to as the "right to be left alone."
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The roots of the modem concern for privacy may be traced to Justice Brandeis' seminal article. Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
126. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 9 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
351 (1967)); see id. at 31 (Harlan, J., concurring). See generally Amsterdam, supra
note 13, at 388.
127. 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980).
128. Id. at 1381-82; see United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S.
297, 313 (1972). However, outside the home, a person has been accorded less fourth
amendment protection. For example, the Supreme Court has indicated that in a public place a person may have no reasonable expectation of privacy. See United States
v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976) (sustaining an arrest without a warrant in a public
place); cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351 (1967) ("What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own house or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection."). See also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977);
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), indicating that an individual has a lesser expectation of privacy with respect to his or her car in part due to its mobility.
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Taking the two factors together-the actions of the police and
the individual's reasonable expectations of privacy in the location of
the encounter-will enable trial courts to arrive at a determination
29
based on objective factors as to whether a seizure has occurred.1
EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY IN AN AIRPORT

Airports today are often the scene of congestion and chaos. 130
Air travelers frequently experience traffic delays, cancellations, detours due to weather conditions, and lost baggage, 131 with each
passenger having his or her own "favorite horror story."132 The increase in the number of airline passengers in the last decade has
been staggering, causing many airports to burst at their seams. 1 33
In 1979, close to 300 million passengers flew on scheduled domestic flights. 134 New York's LaGuardia airport handled 25,000 passengers each day that year.135 In 1978, National Airlines traffic at Ft.
Lauderdale's airport reached the levels predicted for 1984.136 At-

lanta's airport has had so many passengers that the congestion in
the corridors leading to the boarding gates on a normal weekday
has been described as resembling "the movement in the grandstands of football games between halves."' 137 The minimum conclusion to be drawn from this information is that an individual's expectation of privacy in an airport is diminished at least by comparison
129. A difficulty with of this type of analysis is that to the extent the determination as to whether a seizure has occurred turns on an individual's reasonable expectations of privacy, the determination whether a given expectation is reasonable must

be made for each location of any encouner between citizens and the police. For example, as the discussion as to airports indicates, see text accompanying notes 130-153
infra, courts must be sensitive to many factors in determining which expectations of
privacy society is prepared to recognize as reasonable for any given location. Among
these factors are: (1) the level of government regulation or the extent of the government's presence already in the area; (2) the public or private nature of the location,
and; (3) the patterns of interaction in the location. See generally 3 W. LAFAVE, supra
note 9, § 9.2, at 53-54.
130. See Airport Congestion, TRAVEL/HOLIDAY, Sept. 1979, at 22.

131. See Reinhold, A Night's Stress Reflects Plight of Transportation, N.Y.
Times, July 18, 1979, at 12, col. 4.
132. Stinnett, The Wary Traveler, ATLANTIC, Aug. 1979, at 24.
133.

ECONOMIST, June 23, 1979, at 113.

134.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD AND FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,
AIRPORT ACTIVITY STATISTICS OF THE CERTIFICATED ROUTE CARRIERS 12 (1979).

135. Id. at 14.
136. Passenger Handling Snags Clogged Airports, AVIATION WEEK, Oct. 23,

1978, at 163-64.
137.

ATLANTIC, Aug. 1979, at 25.
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to that expectation in the home. The practical effect of this diminution is illustrated by the legally sanctioned solicitation of contributions in airports by members of certain religious groups.1 38 Certainly,
no one would suggest that the law would not allow one to bar similar solicitation in one's living room.
While the factors mentioned above contribute to the diminished expectation of privacy in the airport, perhaps the most important factor is the utilization of antihijacking systems. For unlike
the sheer number of passengers, the ubiquitous antihijacking devices relate directly to the law-enforcement function. Since 1973,
pursuant to Federal Aviation Administration directives,1 39 all passengers have been required to pass through a metal detector. 140 At
the same time, all carry-on bags are searched either manually or by
x-ray weapons detectors.' 4 ' If the device's indicators are triggered,
passengers are required to produce identification, while armed lawenforcement officials stand by. 142 The expectations of privacy that
passengers have as to their person, luggage, and other personal belongings are therefore greatly diminished by the simple fact that
they are constantly having such items either searched or inspected.
In addition to having their baggage searched, airline passengers, on both domestic and international flights, are required to
show their airline tickets and boarding passes.143 Indeed, on international flights, the extent to which luggage is searched and 44passengers are required to produce identification is even greater.1

138. See Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Rochford, 585 F.2d 263,
268-69 (7th Cir. 1978); N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1979, at 25, col. 1.
139. 14 C.F.R. §§ 107, 121.538, 121.584, 121.589 (1980). See generally Note,

The Constitutionality of Airport Searches, 72 MIcH. L. REv. 128 (1973).
140. A metal detector or magnometer is designed to detect the presence of
metal objects with substantial ferrous content carried by a passenger either on his
person or inside his carry-on luggage. See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077,
1085-86 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
141. Id. at 1083-86; see United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 900-02 (9th Cir.
1973). See generally Note, The Airport Search and the Fourth Amendment:
Reconciling the Theories and Practices, 7 U.C.L.A.-ALAs. L. REV. 307 (1978).
142. See Note, supra note 139, at 131 (citing Department of Transportation
Press Release No. 103-72, Dec. 5, 1972).
143. As part of their duty to screen passengers, see 14 C.F.R. §§ 121.538,
121.584, 121.585 (1980), airlines are required to check passengers' airline tickets and
boarding passes. Interview with Eliot Blue, Airport Security Agent, Federal Aviation
Administration, John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York, Sept. 29, 1980.
144. Unlike passengers arriving on domestic flights, passengers arriving on international flights are subject to more extensive, albeit still routine border searches
simply by virtue of the fact that they have crossed our national border. See United
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Furthermore, most airports display signs and announce over
public-address systems that all passengers are subject to being
searched. 145 While the constitutionality of whether a passenger

therefore "impliedly consents" to a search based on these signs and
announcements may be doubtful, 14 6 their existence attests to the
fact that an individual would be unreasonable to expect that he or

she would not be subject to some method of search in the interest
of law enforcement.
To be sure, a person does not divest himself or herself of all
constitutional protection simply by venturing into a public airwhat the foregoing factors illustrate is the unavoidable

port. 147 Yet,

relationship between individual values and public values. Professor
Amsterdam has observed that, if any "particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go unregulated by
constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and freedom re-

maining to citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent
States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) (international mail); United States v.
Nieves, 609 F.2d 642, 645 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 1044 (1980); United

States v. Asbury, 586 F.2d 973, 975 (2d Cir. 1978). See generally Note, Border
Searches and the FourthAmendment, 77 YALE L.J. 1007, 1012 (1968).
145. United States v. Doran, 482 F.2d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 1973). See generally
Note, supra note 139, at 149-52.
146. Some courts have concluded that airline searches could be upheld on an
"implied consent" theory. See United States v. Miner, 484 F.2d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir.
1973); United States v. Doran, 482 F.2d at 932. Other courts, however, have held
that a passenger must be specifically apprised of the right to refuse the search by not
boarding the plane and that posted signs do not take the place of express consent.
See United States v. Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284, 1287-88 (C.D. Cal. 1972); United
States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1092-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). The Supreme Court decision in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), throws doubt upon the validity of the "implied consent" doctrine despite the fact that subsequent to
Schneckloth some courts have held that a consent may be made voluntarily, without
an express warning of the right to refuse a search. See, e.g., United States v.
Edwards, 359 F. Supp. 764, 768 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); People v. Kuhn, 33 N.Y.2d 203,
209, 306 N.E.2d 777,779, 351 N.Y.S.2d 649, 653 (1973). In Schneckloth the search
was found to be constitutional when the defendant expressly agreed to it, albeit verbally. 412 U.S. at 223-49. Present airport security systems, however, are unlikely to
meet the standard of "express consent," even after Schneckloth, for at no point is the
verbal or written assent of the passenger obtained. See Note, supra note 139, at 151.
See generally Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REv.
47, 57 (1974).
147. 100 S.Ct. at 1876; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967)
(citations omitted): "[Tlhe fourth amendment protects people, not places .... But
what [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected." See also 1 B. SCHWVARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: RIGHTS OF PERSONS, SANCTITY, PRIVACY AND EXPRESSION 228 (1968).
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with the aims of a free and open society." 148 At the same time,
however, if constitutional restraints were to be at all times absolute, the values served and protected by law enforcement would be
equally diminished. This fact, inherent in Professor Amsterdam's
analysis and displayed in a myriad of tangible reminders throughout airports every day, makes it unreasonable to recognize an expectation 9 that no police-citizen interaction will occur in a public
airport.

14

Sylvia Mendenhall may have preferred to be asked questions
by an airline agent instead of a government agent. This cannot,
however, compel a different result. The choice to respond to questions asked by either an airline agent or government agent was Ms.
Mendenhall's. In either case, she had a similar choice to walk
away. As long as she remained free to make her own decision, any
expectation of privacy she may have held was not infringed upon
by the government agents. 150 Thus, since the defendant's freedom
148. Amsterdam, supra note 13, at 403.
149. Another commentator has noted that "if one is to live and thrive in this
closely set society, he must agree, either consciously or unconsciously, to abdicate
some measure of personal privacy." M. SLOUGH, PRivAcy, FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 6 (1969). Similarly, a third commentator has observed that "[a]s a value privacy does not exist in isolation, but is part and parcel of the system of values that
regulates action in society." Simmel, Privacy is Not an Isolated Freedom, 13 NoMos
71 (1971). See also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (The nature of a particular practice and the likely extent of its impact on the
individual's sense of security as measured by the customs and values of the past and
present must be balanced against the utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement); United States v. Vilhotti, 323 F. Supp. 425, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (The
court must take into account both the "contemporary norms of social conduct and the
imperatives of a viable democratic society."); Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42
N.Y.U.L. REv. 34 (1967); Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz
Study of Fourth Amendment Protection,43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 968, 983 (1968).
150. Furthermore, the police would have been able to obtain the information
on her airline ticket from the airline if they had chosen to do so. Even if an individual does have an actual expectation of privacy in his or her airline ticket, this expectation is not one that society is likely prepared to recognize as reasonable. As already
noted, see text accompanying notes 125-126 supra, the fourth amendment protects
only a person's reasonable expectations of privacy. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 9

(citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). As the Supreme Court
stressed in Katz, what a person knowingly "exposes" to the public is not a subject of
fourth amendment protection. 389 U.S. at 351. Indeed, the Supreme Court has consistently held that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information
that is conveyed to third parties. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744
(1979) (reasonable expectations of privacy in phone numbers dialed forfeited when
numbers are conveyed to the phone company to complete the call); United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-44 (1976) (reasonable expectation of privacy in financial information conveyed to bank forfeited because of exposure to bank employees in the
ordinary course of business).
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was not limited by anything other than her desire to cooperate, 151
no fourth amendment interest would be served by classifying the
encounter in Mendenhall as a seizure.
Given the contemporary reality of an individual's experience
in a public airport and the resultant diminution in the reasonable
expectation of privacy, law-enforcement officials should constitutionally be able to seek a citizen's cooperation in order to prevent
and detect criminal activity 152 without being required to articulate
It is doubtful that Sylvia Mendenhall maintained any actual expectation of privacy in her airline ticket. Even assuming she had, her voluntary decision to enter
into a relationship with the airline, with the knowledge that her airline ticket would
be "exposed" to the airline and its employees in the ordinary course of business, forfeited any reasonable expectation of privacy she may have had that the information
would not be conveyed to the government.
151. See United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 944 (1978). In Wylie, the defendant had been questioned concerning his identity and activities immediately prior to an encounter that took place in a bank from
which he attempted to withdraw money without any identification. In applying a
reasonable man test of whether the person was under a "reasonable impression that
he was not free to leave," the court held that there was no seizure in the situation
where the individual was free to choose whether to continue the encounter, and did
choose to do so. Id. at 68. See generally E. NEWMAN, POLICE, THE LAW AND PER-

SONAL FREEDOM 49 (1964); see also United States v. Brunson, 549 F.2d 348, 357 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 842 (1977).
152. The government's interest in preventing and detecting crime in airports is
focused on two areas: the prevention of hijacking and the prevention of narcotics
trafficking. The former interest is primarily concerned with the protection of lives
and property. See Note, supra note 141, at 311. Some courts have "judicially noticed" the grave threat that air piracy poses to national air commerce. See, e.g.,
United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947
(1972). "As a crime, air piracy exceeds all others in terms of the potential for great
and immediate harm." United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 48 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 840 (1973). See generally McClintock, Skyjacking: Its Domestic,
Civil and Criminal Ramifications, 38 J. Am & COMM. 29, 36 (1973). Courts have
consistently recognized this and have held that airport security measures are constitutionally justified as a limited and relatively insignificant invasion of privacy, as balanced against the overwhelming societal interest created by the imminent danger of
passenger deaths. E.g., United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Bell,
464 F.2d 667, 675 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972). The embodiment of this overriding governmental concern is manifested in the federal law
against hijacking. Antihijacking Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. § 1472 (i)-(m) (1976).
In addition to the prevention of hijacking, there is also a strong governmental interest in preventing the distribution of illegal narcotics. The federal government's effort to curtail the illegal use of drugs is carried out by the Drug Enforcement Administration, created in July, 1973, by President Nixon's Reorganization Plan No. 2 of
1973. See The Nation's War on Drugs is Now under a Unified Command, DRUG
ENFORCEMENT, Fall, 1973, at 2. The public interest in preventing drug trafficking
because of its immense societal costs has been embodied in many of the nation's
criminal laws. E.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-851 (1980). It has also been duly noted by many
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any certain level of suspicion.' 53 Only when an individual's freedom to choose his or her response is denied should such an articulation be required. The following two hypothetical situations are of-

fered in illustration of the "totality" test advocated.
Situation A

1 54

At approximately five o'clock p.m., defendant E deplanes at
gate 68 of Atlanta's International Airport from a flight which originated in Detroit, Michigan. Although E is not spotted when she

gets off the plane, two plain-clothes DEA agents observe E as she
heads toward the main terminal. The DEA agents notice that E is
not carrying any baggage. E is then seen walking into and out of
gate 66 at a time when no flights are due to arrive there. E then
walks to a window, on the opposite side of the corridor, overlooking an airplane parking area. After looking out the window, E

walks through gate 65, where a little earlier a flight had nearly finished deplaning.
E resumes walking in the agents' direction, looking back several times. E stops a few feet in front of the agents to examine both

an electronic flight monitor located in the hallway and her ticket.
At this point, the DEA agents notice that E does not have any baggage claim receipts attached to her ticket.
courts. See, e.g., United States v. Korman, 614 F.2d 541, 547 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 2918 (1980). United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 500 (2d Cir. 1979). The
Sixth Circuit, for example, recently stated that judges "ought not to engage in
hypertechnicalities which will hamstring capable and conscientious officers of the
law endeavoring to properly perform their duties in protecting the public from harmful drugs. The airports have been used extensively by narcotics dealers to transport
huge quantities of dangerous drugs from the seaports to inland cities .... " United
States v. Korman, 614 F.2d at 547. See generally W. SEYMOUR, JR., THE YOUNG DIE
QUIETLY: THE NARCOTICS PROBLEM IN AMERICA (1972).
153. Consider section 110.1(1) of the MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDURE, PROPOSED OFFICIAL DRAFr (1975):

(1) Authority to Request Cooperation. A law enforcement officer may ... request any person to furnish information or otherwise cooperate in the investigation or prevention of crime. The officer may request the person to respond to questions, to appear at a police station, or to comply with any other
reasonable request. In making requests pursuant to this Section, no officer
shall indicate that a person is legally obliged to furnish information or otherwise to cooperate if no such legal obligation exists. Compliance with a request for information or other cooperation hereunder shall not be regarded
as involuntary or coerced solely on the ground that such request was made
by one known to be a law enforcement officer.
Id. (emphasis added).
154. Situations A and B are fact patterns based on United States v. Elmore, 595
F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2998 (1980); see note 165 infra.
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E then goes to a Delta Airlines counter where she receives information concerning a flight from Atlanta, Georgia to Birmingham,
Alabama. Agent C, standing in line behind E, learns that E had
previously flown into Atlanta from Detroit. From the Delta Information counter, E proceeds into several small shops. Although E
makes no purchases, she is constantly glancing around.
At this point, the DEA agents decide to question E because
her movements seem consistent with some of the characteristics
commonly associated with drug couriers. DEA agents C and M
identify themselves as federal agents and ask E if she would mind
showing the agents her airline ticket. E says she does mind and begins to turn away. Agent C places his hand on E's arm and says,
"Just a minute! We're federal agents and we want to talk to you.
Let me see your airline ticket."
E hands agent C a one-way ticket from Detroit to Birmingham. The ticket is issued to an "E. Gray." Agent C asks, "Mrs.
Gray,"? and E responds affirmatively. Agent C then asks E if she
would provide additional identification. E states that her sister-inlaw, "E. Gray," had purchased the ticket in advance in Birmingham and E had picked up the ticket in Detroit without any identification. E then hands agent C an Alabama driver's license with her
correct name on it.
At this point agent C believes something is wrong. The ticket
is not marked pre-paid and according to his knowledge it is contrary to airline policy to give out a pre-paid ticket without first
requiring identification. When agent C tells E that he is a federal
narcotics agent, E states that there is a case pending against her for
the sale of heroin. Agent C then gives E's ticket to agent M, who
goes to the Delta ticket counter to learn the history of E's ticket.
Subsequently, agent M returns with the information sought.
The day before, E had flown to Detroit under the name "E.
Gray," with a one-way ticket purchased with cash in Birmingham,
Alabama. She returned less than sixteen hours later, using a oneway ticket which was paid for and picked up in Detroit. Based on
this information, the agents decide to search E and advise her of her
right to refuse. E consents, and heroin is discovered on her person.
Analysis of Situation A-Applying the totality of the circumstances test to determine whether a seizure occurred within the
meaning of the fourth amendment requires two basic steps. First,
the actions taken by the police need be examined. After approaching and identifying themselves as federal agents, the agents asked
E if she would show them her airline ticket. When E refused,
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agent C touched E and restrained her movement. He then said,
"Just a minute! We're federal agents and we want to talk to you.
Let me see the ticket." This show of authority, combined with the
choice of language and tone of voice, conveyed to E that she was
compelled to continue the encounter. This was a demand for information, indicating to E that she was expected to cooperate. Once
the agent took E's ticket, her freedom was restrained.
The second part of the analysis requires inquiry into the reasonable expectations of privacy a person has in the location where
the encounter occurs. Here the location of the encounter is an airport. Although a person's expectations of privacy are low in an airport, 155 a person does not reasonably expect that police officers will
demand information and restrain his or her freedom of movement.
The conclusion to be drawn from the fact pattern in situation
A is that when viewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, a person would not reasonably feel free to
leave. E was seized at the moment agent C touched her and demanded to see her airline ticket. If E is seized at this point, then
reasonable suspicion must be based on the information the agents
have prior to the point of the seizure.1 56 The subsequent information learned cannot be used to provide reasonable suspicion, because if there is an illegal seizure, the evidence derived therefrom
becomes the "fruit" of it. 157 The statements made by E subsequent
to the illegal seizure are deemed to be an "exploitation" of it, unless the government shows that such statements were both voluntary and "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary
taint. "158

E's refusal to cooperate cannot elevate the level of suspicion in
and of itself. As indicated above, the requisite level of suspicion either exists or it does not exist at the moment of the seizure. If it
does not exist and the suspect refuses to identify himself or herself,
or chooses not to cooperate, the level of suspicion is not elevated
to the point where a seizure is justified by virtue of this failure to
cooperate alone.159 This point is illustrated by the Supreme Court's
155. See text accompanying notes 130-153 supra.
156. See note 19 supra.
157. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-87 (1963); Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920).
158. 371 U.S. at 486; see Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979);
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600-04 (1975); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S.
338, 341 (1939). See generally Pitler, supra note 25.
159. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (failure to identify oneself fur-
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decision in Brown v. Texas. 160
In Brown, the Court was confronted with a situation where
the circumstances preceding an officer's seizure of the defendant
failed to engender a reasonable suspicion. 16 1 Although the defen-

dant "looked suspicious," the officer who made the Terry stop
could not point to any specific facts to support that conclusion.

When the defendant refused to identify himself, he was arrested
for, and later convicted of, violating a Texas statute which made it
a crime for any person to refuse to give his or her name and address. 16 2 A unanimous Supreme Court reversed the defendant's

conviction and held that he could not be punished for refusing to
identify himself.L63 The lack of reasonable suspicion before the seizure was not elevated to reasonable suspicion by virtue of the fact
that the defendant refused to cooperate. 164 Hence, in situation A,
E's refusal to cooperate did not provide the reasonable suspicion
required for the stop. Her subsequent seizure was therefore a violation of the fourth amendment if her activities up to the point of

the seizure did not amount to reasonable suspicion.
Situation B
Consider the same set of facts with the following exception:
When the agents initially approach E and identify themselves as
federal agents, instead of refusing to show the agents her airline
nishes no basis for an arrest). The same principle was enunciated by Justice White in
his concurring opinion in Terry v. Ohio, when he stressed that when a person is
stopped on the street he or she is "not obliged to answer, answers may not be
compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basisfor an arrest, although it may
alert the officer to the need for continued observation." 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
160. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
161. Id. at 51-52.
162. Id. at 49. TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 38.02(a) (Vernon 1974) provides in relevant part that a "person commits an offense if he intentionally refuses to
report or gives a false report of his name and residence address to a peace officer
who has lawfully stopped him and requested the information."
163. 443 U.S. at 53. Other state statutes that punish an individual for refusing
to identify himself or herself, or for refusing to answer questions, have been found to
be unconstitutional. See, e.g., People v. DeFillippo, 80 Mich. App. 197, 199-200, 262
N.W.2d 921, 923-24 (1977), rev'd and remanded sub nom., Michigan v. DeFillippo,
443 U.S. 31 (1979) (invalidating Detroit Municipal Code § 39-1-52.3).
164. 443 U.S. at 53. See generally LaFave, supra note 8, at 106-09. However,
the Court has yet to answer the question whether a refusal to cooperate by a suspect
after the police have reasonable suspicion with respect to that suspect can elevate
the level of suspicion to probable cause. See 443 U.S. at 53 n.3.
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ticket, E says, "Sure, here it is," and hands her ticket to agent C.
The same facts are learned and the same statements are made by E
following the point at which she hands the ticket to agent C.
Analysis of Situation B-Applying the totality of the circumstances test to situation B first requires an examination of actions
taken by the agents. Up to the point at which agent M takes E's
airline ticket to the Delta counter, there is no hint of coercion.
There is no physical contact between the agents and E. There is
simply conversation. The only arguable show of authority is the
agents' initial introduction as federal agents. They display no weapons and are wearing no uniforms. Their use of language and tone is
courteous and respectful. They do not summon E to their presence
but rather approach her and request to see her airline ticket. In
short, they do not convey the impression that E is not free to
leave. In his situation the defendant is cooperating with the agents.
She voluntarily provides agent C with her ticket and driver's license, displaying no objective signs that she wishes to walk away
from the encounter. She is acting as if she were talking to anyone
in the airport.
The second part of the analysis involves assessing the reasonable expectations of privacy in the location the encounter takes
place. As noted earlier, in an airport an individual's reasonable
expectations of privacy are very low. These expectations are not
infringed upon when agents simply ask questions or request that
a person produce an airline ticket or some other form of identication.
The conclusion to be drawn from situation B is that E was free
to leave up until the point where agent M removed her ticket and
went to the Delta counter. A reasonable person would not have
believed that he or she was seized until that point. Calling situation B a seizure serves no fourth amendment interests. 165 E had
165. Situation B is based on United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2998 (1980). The question presented in Elmore was,
"When did the seizure take place"? Id. at 1039. After analyzing the Supreme Court
decisions in Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and Sibron, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), the Fifth Circuit concluded that "certain encounters between law enforcement officers and citizens, even for investigative purposes, are not encompassed by the Fourth Amendment." 595 F.2d at 1041. The court held that Elmore was not seized until the federal
agent carried Elmore's ticket away to the Delta counter:
The initial encounter was not precipitated by force. There was no physical
contact. The only show of authority occurred when the agents initially approached Elmore and identified themselves as federal law enforcement officers. Such identification is insufficient to convert an encounter, otherwise
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the freedom to walk away at any point she chose to do so. The mo66
tivations of a person to cooperate with the police are many.'

However, regardless of what they might be, the police should be
able to seek this cooperation.167 The fourth amendment was not intended to prevent citizens from talking to the police if they choose
to do so. There is nothing oppressive or humiliating about two persons conversing in a crowded and congested airport.
Situations A and B demonstrate the differences between seizures and non-seizures within the meaning of the fourth amendment. A seizure takes place only when, in view of the totality of
the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that
he was not free to leave.1 68 Conversely, a person is not seized if he
reasonably would have believed that his freedom of movement was
not restrained. In Mendenhall, the agents approached the defendant, identified themselves as federal agents, and requested to see
the defendant's airline ticket in addition to some other form of
identification. 169 In situation B the agents did the same. A correct
analysis of both situations should therefore yield the conclusion
that the initial approach and request to see the airline ticket or
other form of identification is not a seizure. Rather, if a seizure
occurred, it did so at some time in the future.
CONCLUSION

Justice Stewart's opinion in United States v. Mendenhall
reaffirms the constitutional principle, enunciated by Chief Justice
regarded as outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment, into a Terry
stop.
Id. at 1042.
166. L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRE, & D. ROTENBERO, supra note 36, at 17; see
Tiffany, The FourthAmendment and Police-Citizen Confrontations, 60 J. CifM. L.C.
& P.S. 442, 451-54 (1969); MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, PROPOSED OFFICIAL DRAFT 259-60 (Commentary 1975). Consider the comment in E.
NEvMAN, supra note 151, at 49:
There is nothing in the law which protects a man against himself. In other
words, if a person under suspicion wished to cooperate with the law enforcement officials, and consents, either by his express words or by his actions, to an unreasonable search and seizure, he cannot, at some later date,
invoke the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
167. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6 (1969) (police have the right to
request citizens to cooperate); see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966).
168. 100 S. Ct. at 1877; accord, United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62, 68 (D.C.
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978); United States v. Brunson, 549 F.2d 348,
357 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 842 (1977).

169.

100 S. Ct. at 1876.
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Warren in Terry v. Ohio, that not every encounter between a citizen and the police constitutes a seizure subject to fourth amendment restrictions. If a citizen retains his or her freedom to walk
away, no fourth amendment interests are served if an otherwise inoffensive contact is transformed into a seizure simply because one
party to the conversation is a police officer.
The totality of the circumstances test suggested by Justice
Stewart and expanded upon in this Note requires the court to as-

sess in detail both the actions of the police and the reasonable expectations of privacy in the location where the encounter takes
place. Because it represents an objective method of balancing
competing values and constitutional interests, it should be utilized
in assessing police-citizen encounters. A close analysis of the reality
of the situation reveals that it makes little sense to speak of the
necessary level of suspicion the police must have to make a seizure, if no seizure has occurred within the meaning of the fourth
amendment.
Utilizing the totality of the circumstances test advocated may
have significant consequences. The police will often have the right
to approach citizens, ask questions, and request to see some identification without possessing reasonable suspicion. However, if a suspect refuses to cooperate, the police cannot detain the person
against his or her will, absent reasonable suspicion. As the Supreme Court stated in Davis v. Mississippi, "while the police have
the right to request citizens to answer voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes, they have no right to compel them to
1 70
answer. "
As noted earlier, 171 the police often learn critical information
in the early stages of their encounters with citizens. However, the
information learned by the police after the seizure cannot be used
to justify the seizure. Once there is a seizure, reasonable suspicion
either exists or it does not exist. The refusal to cooperate, however, cannot be a factor in elevating the level of suspicion to the
point at which the seizure is justified.
Mendenhall does not erode the constitutional safeguards established by Terry and its progeny. Rather, it adds a new dimension-a new starting point-to the analysis. The Terry balancing test remains, but it should be utilized only after the court

170.
171.
supra.

394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6 (1969).
See text accompanying note 18 supra. See also text accompanying note 44
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makes a threshold determination that the individual has been
seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Should the
court determine that there has been no seizure, then there has
been no intrusion upon any constitutionally protected interest.
Scott J. Glick
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